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Abstract
The article concerns the revision of earlier decisions to offshore production activities (so called “relocation of second 
degree”); more specifically it is focused on the “reshoring” (also referred as “relocation to the home country”, “back-
reshoring” or “back-shoring”). The research aims are to investigate what types of mistakes occur along the decision-making 
and implementation process and how they affect the outcome, in terms of success or failure, of a relocation strategy. A 
multiple case study involving four companies in the fashion industry from Portugal and Italy was conducted. The cross-case 
analysis allowed to differentiate decision-making mistakes from implementation ones and to assess differences and similarities 
among the cases in terms of content of the relocation, drivers and outcomes. The research contributes to previous literature 
on reshoring by bringing evidence of different types of mistakes to be considered, thus requiring further conceptualization 
of the reshoring process. Managers and entrepreneurs should consider the importance of doing the things right also during 
the implementation, too often underestimated. The present article is the first one in the reshoring literature bringing evidence 
of cases of failure in the relocation decisions and discriminating among different kinds of mistakes.
Keywords Reshoring · Relocations · Offshoring · Italy · Portugal · Manufacturing
1 Introduction
After decades of implementing manufacturing offshoring 
strategies, in the last few years, companies have been 
critically evaluating their earlier location decisions. Due to 
a variety of motivations (Fratocchi et al. 2016; Srai and Ané 
2016; Barbieri et al. 2018), companies are modifying these 
decisions, thus relocating activities either to their home 
country (Relocation to the Home Country, RHC) or to a 
third country (Relocation to a Third Country, RTC), different 
from the previous one (Barbieri et al. 2019). Moving back to 
the home country is not an easy journey. In fact, depending 
on the specific choices made by the firm over the previous 
offshoring period (Johansson and Olhager 2018), many 
things might have changed in the home country over time 
and the company’s readiness might not be appropriate to 
undertake such a journey (Nujen and Halse 2017; Nujen 
et al. 2018b, a). To add difficulty, even if researchers have 
dug into the reasons that drive a company to relocate to the 
home country, little is known about how companies take 
such decision and the difficulty they face along with its 
implementation (Barbieri et al. 2018; Boffelli and Johansson 
2020; Boffelli et al. 2020).
Reshoring (alternatively called in literature as “back-
reshoring” or “back-shoring”) has been defined as “a 
voluntary corporate strategy regarding the home-country 
partial or total relocation of (in-sourced or out-sourced) 
production to serve local, regional, or global demands” 
(Fratocchi et al. 2014; Barbieri et al. 2019). This recent 
phenomenon has been increasingly attracting scholars 
(for detailed literature reviews we refer to Stentoft et al. 
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2016; Wiesmann et al. 2017; Barbieri et al. 2018). Many 
scholars recognize a major differentiation between reshoring 
decisions assumed as a result of a “strategic shift” (Baraldi 
et al. 2018; Di Mauro et al. 2018), triggered by changes 
either in the external or internal environment (Martínez-
Mora and Merino 2014; Fratocchi et al. 2016), and the ones 
made as a reaction to a “managerial mistake” (Kinkel and 
Maloca 2009; Ellram et al. 2013; Kinkel 2014). However, 
while several works have provided cases of decisions due to 
changes in the overall strategy, no study has yet considered 
cases of failure of previous relocation decisions. This is 
due to the difficulty in getting access to information related 
to unsuccessful decisions since companies are often not 
much willing to share their bad experiences. Nevertheless, 
the analysis of the unsuccessful cases, as well as their 
comparison with successful ones, can be extremely helpful 
to shed new light on the reshoring phenomenon and to 
develop useful managerial implications (Silva and Silva 
2012).
Starting from these premises, this paper aims to 
explore the kind of mistakes that companies can do when 
addressing a relocation decision. Specifically, we aim to 
i) understand what types of mistakes, committed by the 
people involved in the reshoring process (independently of 
their role within the company), can occur along with the 
relocation processes – i.e., both offshoring and reshoring 
– and ii) whether the mistakes occurred in the company’s 
history of relocation decisions may affect the outcome, 
in terms of failure or success, of reshoring. In alignment 
with these objectives, this research adopts a multiple-case 
study approach, involving four companies belonging to the 
fashion industry (and particularly footwear and clothing), a 
competitive environment where outsourcing and offshoring 
strategies have been implemented for a long time (Camuffo 
et al. 2006). More specifically, the offshoring and reshoring 
strategies implemented by a Portuguese and three Italian 
firms have been investigated. To gain an overall picture 
over the four cases, the framework proposed by Boffelli 
and Johansson (2020) has been adopted. This framework 
conceptualizes both offshoring and reshoring processes 
as made of three building blocks: decision-making, 
implementation, and outcome. Based on the collected data, 
we argue that the success of a reshoring decision depends 
more on whether it was correctly implemented rather than 
why it was taken (i.e., mistake vs. strategic shift in response 
to internal or external changes).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: 
section two contains the literature review about 
reshoring, with a particular focus on decision-making and 
implementation, and mistakes connected to relocations. 
In section three, the adopted multiple-case study research 
methodology is explained, while section four reports the 
main results through the within and the cross-case analyses 
of the four case studies. Then, the results are discussed 
against the previous literature, to let the main theoretical 
contributions emerge. The latter are discussed, together 
with managerial implications, limitations and future 
research directions, in the concluding section.
2  Literature review
2.1  Reshoring drivers and process
The definition of reshoring ref lects a feature of 
voluntariness of the decision and its strategic relevance, 
given its potential long-term impact on profitability 
and competitive position (Gylling et al. 2015). Despite 
the voluntariness, reshoring decisions are complex and 
many variables need to be considered, as demonstrated 
by the huge amount of influencing drivers identified 
in previous literature (Fratocchi et  al. 2016; Srai and 
Ané 2016; Stentoft et al. 2016; Wiesmann et al. 2017; 
Barbieri et al. 2018). Employing an extensive literature 
review, Barbieri et al. (2018) identify 66 different drivers, 
proving the great heterogeneity of the reasons behind 
reshoring decisions. As the first step in their categorization 
effort, the authors separate drivers according to the two-
fold conceptualization of reshoring as correction of a 
managerial mistake or as a strategic decision, further 
divided into internal and external environmental changes. 
Managerial mistake drivers include, for example, 
miscalculations of actual costs, lack of knowledge on the 
host country, lack of systematic location planning and 
bounded rationality. Instead, strategic decision drivers 
include factors connected both to the external and to the 
internal environment and related to specific categories, as 
reported in Fig. 1.
The assessment of potential drivers, namely the 
“why” question, represents the first fundamental step 
in the reshoring process made of decision-making and 
implementation (Boffelli et al. 2020), namely the “how” 
question, which is the most under-researched area in the 
literature about reshoring (Wiesmann et al. 2017; Barbieri 
et al. 2018). Among the few contributions in this respect, 
Joubioux and Vanpoucke (2016) develop a framework to 
guide location decision-making, highlighting a strong path 
dependency with the previous offshoring decision. Similarly, 
Bals et al. (2016) first conceptualize the distinction between 
decision-making and implementation and Gray et al. (2017) 
add bounded rational features to the decision-making 
process. Finally, Boffelli and Johansson (2020) provide a 
comprehensive framework reconciling existing frameworks. 
Based on these contributions, three major building blocks 
were considered for the processes both of offshoring and 
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reshoring, namely decision-making, implementation and 
outcomes. Table 1 reports a description of these elements, 
which will be used to illustrate each case investigated in 
this research.
2.2  Mistakes connected to reshoring
Reshoring decisions are often conceptualized in the 
literature as a correction of previous errors made by the 
managers or entrepreneurs during the offshoring process, 
such as insufficient planning and lack of knowledge about 
the offshore location (Kinkel and Maloca 2009; Kinkel 
2014). Barbieri et al (2018) in their literature review found 
that more than one-third of the articles were reporting some 
kind of managerial mistake drivers, with “miscalculation 
of actual cost and/or adoption of new cost accounting 
methods” being the most relevant. Coherently, Kinkel (2014) 
estimates from empirical data that only 20% of reshoring 
decisions made by German companies are mid- or long-
term reactions to changes in the local environment, while 
the majority of them (around 80%) are pure corrections of 
managerial mistakes. It is important to highlight that, even if 
reshoring literature used to refer to “managerial mistakes”, 
this term might not reflect the errors and mistakes that 
may happen during a reshoring process, since multiple 
people might be involved, besides managers (Fratocchi and 
Silva 2018). Therefore, in this paper we will use the more 
general term “mistake”, to indicate that we will consider 
any kind of mistakes happening along the reshoring process, 
independently from who is responsible for the mistake.
Management literature has addressed mistakes typically 
under the perspective of leadership failure (Van and Leslie 
1995; Leslie and Velsor 1996). Authors have extensively 
addressed the reasons of bad management (McCall and 
Lombardo 1983; Hogan 1994; Hogan and Hogan 2002; 
Dotlich and Cairo 2003; Finkelstein 2004, 2005) typically 
Fig. 1  Drivers for reshoring 
(adapted from Barbieri 
et al. 2018)
Table 1  Elements of the relocation process
Element Description References
Decision-making All the aspects included in the decision, starting from the 
motivations driving the relocation decision (including the 
tipping point), coming to the specific product and activities 
to be relocated, the location decision and the decision-
making process
Bals et al. (2016); Foerstl et al. (2016); Fratocchi et al. 
(2016); Joubioux and Vanpoucke (2016); Benstead et al. 
(2017); Boffelli and Johansson (2020)
Implementation All the aspects related to how the reshoring decision can 
be operationalized, such as governance mode, degree 
of relocation, incremental or instantaneous process, 
maintaining production at the domestic/foreign site, 
information sharing and preparation activities
Bals et al. (2016); Benstead et al. (2017); Boffelli and 
Johansson (2020)
Outcomes The result connected to the relocation decision in terms of 
benefits or problems, both in the short-term and in the 
long-term




classifying these as the results of unethical behaviour or due 
to lack of competences (Kellerman 2004). Several works have 
been focusing on the reasons why managers make wrong 
decisions leading to several possible sources such as routines 
(Nelson and Winter 1982), lack of experience and structure 
(Larsen et al. 2013), organizational complexity (Lundberg and 
Thompson 1967; Argyris and Schön 1997), lack of information 
(Finkelstein 2004, 2005), individual bias (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1984; Das and Teng 1999), failure to follow the 
clues and strong signals (Finkelstein 2004), the existence of 
a dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis 1986), wrong or not 
well-defined goals (Cafferata 2016). Burke (2006) provides a 
rather comprehensive review of these factors.
Even though previous research found Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs) being more subjected to 
making mistakes in the offshoring decision evaluation 
due to shortage of internal resources (Kinkel and Maloca 
2009), the evidence here reported does not exclude larger 
companies from being exposed to similar mistakes. The 
literature on managerial mistakes points attention to “growth 
traps” (Argenti 1976; Smart and Vertinsky 1977; Abatecola 
2019) that can lead larger companies to fail due to issues 
like dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis 1986), failure to 
follow the clues and strong signals (Finkelstein 2004), lack 
of information (Finkelstein 2004), organizational complexity 
(Larsen et al. 2013).
Albertoni et al. (2017) suggest that managerial mistakes 
arise in all the cases in which firms experience hidden or 
unexpected costs during the offshoring period (Larsen et al. 
2013), linked for example to coordination costs higher than 
expected or to more costly knowledge transfer. Moreover, 
they state that companies are more likely to reshore if they 
do not achieve satisfactory performance. Managers prefer to 
align themselves with success rather than failure and thus they 
are encouraged to withdraw from mistakes (Lee Fiona et al. 
2004; Palmer et al. 2010), leading often to additional failures 
(Finkelstein 2004). Connected to this last point, Di Mauro et al. 
(2018) associated problems with operational performance to 
mistakes correction. Some authors have suggested that, given 
that the offshoring decisions are likely to be biased because of 
bounded rationality or behavioural heuristics, reshoring may 
represent a short-term mistake correction (Gray et al. 2017).
Despite a strong association between mistakes and 
outcomes have been identified, research has not been 
conducted yet, to the best of our knowledge, on how 
mistakes influence the success or failure of a reshoring 
strategy. Moreover, until now literature has assumed that 
mistakes only occurred during the decision-making, while 
implementation-related mistakes have not been considered 
by the literature. Even if previous literature on reshoring 
agrees in considering managerial mistakes behind the 
drivers of the relocation decision (Barbieri et al. 2018), to 
the best of our knowledge, no research has been conducted 
to better understand what kind of mistakes can occur along 
the decision-making and implementation process (Boffelli 
et al. 2020). Therefore, even if the three elements of the 
reshoring process, namely decision-making, implementation 
and outcomes, can be expected to be intertwined, a gap in 
previous research exists concerning how mistakes happened 
in each of the two phases of the reshoring process (decision 
making and implementation) influenced the outcomes of the 
process itself. This research candidates to fill this gap, by 
answering the following research question:
RQ1: What types of mistakes occur along the decision-
making and implementation process?
Moreover, this paper aims to understand whether 
mistakes occurred in the company’s history of relocation 
decisions – i.e., both during offshoring and reshoring – may 
affect the outcome, in terms of failure or success, of the 
relocation itself. Particularly, by looking at the decision-
making and implementation processes of both offshoring 
and reshoring, we aim to assess the mistakes happened and 
how they influenced the success or failure of both decisions. 
Moreover, we will consider offshoring a failure if the 
company completely relocated to the home country, without 
leaving any activities or product lines in the host country, 
while reshoring will be considered a failure if the production 
in the home country was later transferred back completely 
to the host country or if the whole company went bankrupt. 
Therefore, the second research question is:
RQ2: How mistakes affect the outcome, in terms of 
success or failure, of a relocation strategy?
3  Multiple‑case study methodology
Given the explorative aims of this paper and the 
willingness to dig deeper into cause-and-effect 
relationships, a multiple-case study methodology seemed 
an appropriate approach. This methodological perspective 
allows enriching knowledge regarding the reshoring 
phenomenon. More specifically, authors adopted the 
inductive case study methodology since this approach 
is particularly oriented towards exploration, discovery, 
and inductive logic (Patton 2002) and is recognised as 
appropriate to develop data grounded testable theories 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Voss et al. 2002).
To implement the chosen methodology, the research was 
designed around the following steps: a) cases selection, b) 
data collection, c) within-case analysis, d) cross-case analysis.
Concerning the selection of the cases, given the willingness 
to study the overall process from offshoring to reshoring, we 
selected the offshoring-reshoring process with the firm as a 
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unit of analysis. Thus, case selection was focused on firms 
that already went through both the offshoring and reshoring, 
allowing the assessment of the outcomes. A homogeneous 
sampling approach (Patton 2002) was adopted, to ensure 
that variations are not caused by extraneous/confounding 
variables (Saunders et al. 2003). Four companies from the 
fashion industry have been selected as cases: two footwear 
companies from Italy and Portugal, one clothing company 
and one dyeing company both from Italy. The four companies 
differed in terms of the outcome of the reshoring process, as 
Pt-Shoes and It-Clothes were cases of failure, while It-Shoes 
and It-Yarns were cases of success. Table 2 summarises the 
main features of the sampled companies.
Data were collected through one semi-structured interview 
per case (the questions used as a basis for the semi-structured 
interviews are provided in Appendix A). The interviewees 
were the people that were directly involved in the reshoring 
decisions and that followed its implementation. Each 
interview lasted at least two hours with the involvement of 
at least two members of the research team. Interviews were 
recorded and fully transcribed. The collected information 
was supplemented with internal documents (e.g., project 
plans, reports, market performance, balance sheets) 
provided by the companies and with external secondary 
sources (e.g., press reports on the offshoring or reshoring 
initiatives), thus allowing to triangulate evidence (Eisenhardt 
1989). Preliminary versions of the case studies reports 
were developed and sent back to the informants, to verify 
information accuracy. As a result of the feedback received, 
the final versions of the case studies reports were developed.
To reduce and categorize cases information, coding and 
data analysis were conducted manually and individually by 
researchers to ensure inter-coder reliability; after internal 
discussions and comparisons of codes, the inter-coder 
agreement reached 100% (Duriau et al. 2007). The cross-
case analysis has been implemented following the building 
blocks proposed by Boffelli and Johansson (2020), namely 
decision-making, implementation and outcomes, which 
allowed researchers to investigate and to compare both, 
the offshoring and reshoring strategies. Concerning the 
outcomes, we considered offshoring a failure if the company 
completely relocated to the home country, without leaving 
any activities or product lines in the host country, while 
reshoring was considered a failure if the production in the 
home country was later transferred back completely to the 
host country or if the whole company went bankrupt.
The rigour of the research was assured by adopting the 
strategies suggested by Yin (2003) and Eisenhardt (1989). To 
enhance construct validity, all researchers were on the same 
page in terms of literature background and were constantly 
involved in the different steps of the research. Besides, 
secondary sources were used for triangulation purposes, 
such as news, the companies’ websites, balance sheet data. 
The internal validity was achieved thanks to the adoption 
of a pattern matching approach, which consisted of the 
construction of arrays summarizing cases data that enabled 
the comparison across cases of similarities and differences, 
and an iterative proposition development (Voss et al. 2016). 
The presence of multiple cases allowed to increase external 
validity, even if the choice to focus on a specific and known 
context may limit generalizability. Finally, reliability is 
ensured by the transparency of the adopted research process.
4  Within case analysis
4.1  It‑Shoes
It-Shoes is a mountain shoe manufacturer located in a little 
village within the so-called “district of sportive shoes” 
of Montebelluna in North-Eastern Italy. The company 
was founded in 1979 as a handicraft shoes company. The 
Table 2  Summary of cases
Firms characteristics It-Shoes Pt-Shoes It-Clothes It-Yarns
Product line Mountain shoes Dress shoes Total look clothes Dyed yarns for clothing








Firm size (according to the European 
Commission definition)
Small Medium Large Medium
Establishment year 1976 1979 1965 1905
Offshoring year 1999 2004 2000–2014 2004
Reshoring year 2009 2010 2016 2011
Home country Italy Portugal Italy Italy
Host country (interested by the  
reshoring decision)
Romania Morocco Croatia Hungary






production cycle was completely handmade and based on the 
technical skills of the entrepreneur and his employees. Since 
its establishment, the company occupied a niche market 
characterized by high-reliability and high-quality products. 
However, since the little number of sales of products with 
the owned brand, the entrepreneur decided to operate also 
as a contract manufacturer. In 1997, the company started 
a collaboration with a French group, which bought the 
company’s brand the following year. The company then 
launched its own new brand continuing to supply the 
French client, which accounted for around 70% of total 
sales. Manufacturing activities have been always in-sourced 
while materials were supplied only by Italian partners since 
materials directly impact the perceived product quality.
Given the continued pressure by the French client to 
lower production costs, the entrepreneur decided to verify 
opportunities for offshoring production activities to Eastern 
Europe. He decided to relocate only the low- and mid-end 
product lines, mainly made for the main customer; the 
manufacturing of high-quality mountain shoes remained 
in-sourced in the home plant. Having implemented a “slicing 
offshoring” strategy, the company retained all machinery 
within the Italian factory, even if the production volumes 
were dramatically reduced.
Even though It-Shoes’ production had been relocated 
to Romania considerably, thus reducing the final product 
cost, the French client continued to request further price 
reductions. Meeting these demands became impossible 
without implementing a “further offshoring” strategy 
addressed to even lower-cost countries (like China and 
South-East Asia). The entrepreneur evaluated it too risky. 
More specifically, he was worried by the increasing 
control problems that would have emerged after relocating 
production activities so far from the home location. 
Considered this huge risk, the entrepreneur understood that 
the only alternative for the firm’s survival was changing its 
competitive strategy. More specifically, he decided to enlarge 
revenues of the firms’ brand. However, the decision to focus 
on the own brand was no more compatible with the choice 
of locating the entire production process in Romania. In 
this respect, it must be noted that in the mountain shoes 
segment (and more generally in the shoes market) a product 
certified as “made in Italy” is associated by customers with 
a considerably higher value (Di Mauro et al. 2018). In the 
case of It-Shoes, such a better customer perception was 
supported by the firm’s high reputation as a producer of 
cutting-edge technical mountain shoes gained by its high-
end product line. However, EU law states it is possible 
to certify a product as “made in Italy” only if the most 
value-adding production activities are performed in Italy. 
“Minor” production activities (like upper production) may 
remain offshore. Therefore, in 2009 It-Shoes relocated the 
assembling and finishing production phases to Italy, while 
leaving the “upper” production in Romania. The choice 
of not completely ending the production activities in the 
host country means that the offshoring decision cannot 
be considered as a failure. The reshoring decision was 
supported by the availability of spare production capacity 
in the home plant since machinery was not sold after 
the initial offshoring decision. The decision to partially 
reshore manufacturing activities was supported also by 
the entrepreneur’s emotional attachment to Italy and the 
Montebelluna district. At the same time, he wanted to give 
his daughter, who was already involved in the company, 
the possibility to manage the business in Italy as It-Shoes 
changed hands from the first generation to the second.
However, the decision to relocate to the home county 
some of the production process phases was not so easy to be 
implemented since the main supplier in Romania declared 
not being interested in doing business with It-Shoes anymore 
since volumes were too small. This induced the entrepreneur 
to find a new supplier that would accept producing only semi-
finished products and in low volumes. With this respect, 
selection criteria related to product quality and lead-time 
were still relevant for the new choice of the supplier. Having 
evaluated various alternatives, the entrepreneur decided 
to sign a production partnership with another Romanian 
firm, which had produced within the Montebelluna district 
until 2001, when it completely relocated its production 
to Romania. The entrepreneurs and founders of the two 
companies were almost the same age and had known each 
other since the 1990s. At that time, the Romanian firm, 
still in Italy, acted as a supplier of It-Shoes for specific 
production phases or in case of peaks of market demand. 
This earlier relationship facilitated the implementation 
of It-Shoes’ reshoring strategy. The entrepreneur of the 
Romanian company stated, “We developed a high level of 
synchronization, […] even when It-Shoes develops a new 
model, it is easy to arrange the new production process”.
The company production capacity was focused on 
“uppers” for shoes addressed to mountaineering, cycling, 
motorcycling and free climbing (the only product line sold 
with the company own brand) segments. For each of the 
three product lines manufactured as a supplier, the Romanian 
company decided to serve only one client. Therefore, It-Shoes 
was sure that the technical know-how transferred to the 
Romanian supplier was not at risk to be disseminated to other 
offshored competitors. As in the previous offshoring phase 
(when production was managed by the former Romanian 
supplier), the material supply of critical materials (e.g., 
leather, soles) was allocated to Italian suppliers.
In evaluating the offshoring experience, the entrepreneur 
of It-Shoes noted: “I went offshore also because of the 
politics of globalization. With hindsight, it was a mass 
mistake. But if 15 years ago I had not done it, I would not 
be here now. There was no other solution”.
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It-Shoes sales are currently around 2 million €, of which 
only 20% still derives by contract manufacturing. Employees 
are around twenty and their average age is quite small 
since the entrepreneur decided to recruit new people after 
relocating manufacturing activities in Italy.
4.2  Pt‑Shoes
Pt-Shoes has been for several years one of the top 10 
footwear manufacturers in Portugal. It was founded in one 
of the two Portuguese regional clusters for the production of 
footwear. The company was initially focused on production 
for local private labels; however, in 2000—foreseeing the 
potential negative impact of China entering the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) – the founder’s son decided to 
develop an owned-brand which was finally launched in 2002. 
With this respect, he declared “We tried to anticipate that 
entry [China’s entry in the WTO], by trying to upgrade our 
competitive advantage. We knew we couldn’t compete on the 
basis of low labour costs anymore and we already had a very 
good knowledge of the production of a good quality shoe”.
In 1999 the company had experienced a severe shortage 
of skilled people in its home area because it had almost 
reached the full employment level. Given the lack of human 
resources, the company opened a new plant in another city 
in Portugal. After the launch of their brand, the two plants 
produced shoes for both the product lines (both private label 
and the owned brand).
At the beginning of 2000, the company experienced 
a strong pressure by private label customers for lower 
prices; therefore, it firmly perceived the risk to lose 
contract manufacturing orders because of the intention 
of international customers to choose Chinese suppliers. 
Therefore, in 2004, the founder decided to open a new 
wholly-owned plant in Morocco, employing up to 100 
people. After the new plant opening, the second plant 
opened in Portugal was shut down and employees dismissed.
Morocco was chosen for several motivations; among 
them, the most relevant were the lower labour costs and 
the geographical proximity. At the same time, it was 
expected that skilled people were locally available; finally, 
the language was not considered as an obstacle as most 
Moroccan people spoke French, and Pt-Shoes’ entrepreneurs 
as well. The Moroccan site was mostly dedicated to 
the manufacture of “uppers”, the most labour-intensive 
production phase. However, in case of demand peaks, the 
plant was requested to produce also entire shoes, but only for 
private labels since the production of branded high-quality 
shoes with the firm’s trademark remained at home.
In the following six years, the firm experienced several 
troubles with its production site in Morocco. First, even 
though Moroccan wages were lower than Portuguese ones 
(around a half), local employees were highly unionised 
and had lower productivity. With this respect, one needs 
to consider frequent production stops due to religious 
issues (observant Muslims are requested to pray five times 
a day and even seven during the Ramadan period when 
productivity levels are further reduced due to fast). Summing 
up, the entrepreneurs realised that productivity in Morocco 
was at least 30% less than in Portugal, an issue was not 
carefully evaluated when taking the offshoring decision. 
Additionally, the managers realised that there were some 
issues concerning the money transfer from one country to 
the other, with delays and taxes to be considered. A second 
motivation inducing the company to relocate production 
activities at the home country is related to the psychic 
distance; while the language was not a barrier, the company 
discovered the Moroccan mental framing was different from 
the Portuguese one. More specifically, the entrepreneur’s 
son noted: “We understood the attitude towards work to 
be much more radical than the one normally displayed by 
Portuguese people. They [Moroccan workers] overreact a 
lot and have not much patience”. Moreover, the local middle 
managers were generally not collaborative and preferred 
to support workers’ criticisms instead of explaining the 
mother company’s requests. However, the manufacturing 
reshoring decision was mainly the consequence of the 
“family succession” within the company that is when the 
entrepreneur’s son replaced his father as CEO. After this 
deal, the large-scale production business model previously 
implemented was completely substituted. The product value-
added was hugely increased and the firm’s brand became 
pivotal in the company strategy. Consequently, the product 
lines were enlarged in terms of models and colours and new 
production techniques were implemented. However, while 
production lots become smaller, it was hard to imprint the 
necessary rhythm within the Moroccan facility. Therefore, 
in 2010, the new CEO decided to completely relocate in 
Portugal all the manufacturing activities, thus reflecting the 
failure of the offshoring strategy. In evaluating the offshoring 
experience, the entrepreneur summarized his mind saying 
“I can consider that as a disappointing experience […] We 
have been in Morocco for six years in total and it was a pity 
that we didn’t realise before that the decision to close should 
be taken. We waited too long to decide to fully concentrate 
our operations again in Portugal”. After the Moroccan site 
closure, production activities were re-transferred to the same 
place where the company had opened the second plant in the 
1990s. Fortunately, people earlier discharged were all still 
available in the local labour market and Pt-Shoes was able 
to re-establish their normal activity soon after.
After a huge growth of its total sales—around 12 million 
€, equally distributed among the two product lines – and 
exports (around 95% of own branded shoes had been sold 
in 800 sales points located in more than 20 foreign markets, 




in April 2018 the CEO decided to liquidate the company. In 
the end, this shows that not even the reshoring strategy can 
be considered a success.
4.3  It‑Clothes
It-Clothes was founded in 1965 as a family firm in Northern 
Italy, in one of the most important industrial districts for 
textiles in Italy, the Treviso textile district. In those days, the 
production activities were completely developed in house, 
and for almost 30 years the production, partially through 
contract manufacturing, remained in Italy. Between the end 
of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, the company 
started to offshore (and outsource) production activities 
mainly in Europe. The offshoring decision was taken by the 
board of directors, that mainly included family members. 
The offshoring and outsourcing process ended in 2014 when 
It-Clothes was only buying final products; it was part of a 
change in the company’s strategy from being a manufacturer 
to becoming a retailer with a recognizable brand. All the 
production sites opened, initially owned by It-Clothes, were 
progressively sold to a company controlled by the same 
holding that was also controlling It-Clothes. From time to time, 
the company was still outsourcing some activities to Italian 
firms, but only in case of very innovative processes (e.g., 
stone wash, vegetable dyeing). For It-Clothes the offshoring 
and outsourcing strategy was a strategic choice to focus on the 
highest value-adding activities and the brand valorisation. In 
2016, It-Clothes decided to start a small relocation project by 
buying some machinery back from the Croatian plant of the 
“sister” company and bringing them back to Italy, but without 
closing any foreign plant. This means that the offshoring 
strategy was not considered a failure by the company. The 
reshoring decision was made by the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) but, along the decision-making process, also the Chief 
Operating Officer (COO) and many company departments 
were involved (namely, marketing and communication, 
sales, and R&D) The machinery was based on a cutting-edge 
technology that allowed It-Clothes to introduce a new seamless 
sweater on the market and to take advantage of the lower 
labour intensity of the process. Of course, all the suppliers 
of raw materials for this product were Italian, so to obtain a 
fully “Made in Italy” product. Besides trying to leverage on 
the “Made in Italy” features of the new products, other reasons 
that pushed It-Clothes to reshore were the higher automation 
(and lower labour intensity) connected to the new technology, 
the possibility to develop new and lost know-how, the higher 
synergies between production and research and development, 
the higher service level that was possible to guarantee to the 
customer, and the company’s image strengthening opportunity.
Given the small scale of the new sweater production, only 
a few shops were selling it and at a higher price with respect 
to a comparable sweater sold in the same shop and produced 
with a different technology outside of Italy. Therefore, for 
what concerns the marketing of the product, It-Clothes failed 
in making the characteristics of the new product evident, such 
as being “Made in Italy”, part of a relocation project and pro-
duced with cutting-edge technology. Even if, in a first period, 
the company benefitted of a return in terms of improved firm’s 
image in front of the mass media and of its employees, the 
reshoring project was ended soon, given the low appreciation 
of the new product by the market. Interestingly, the company, 
starting from 2017, has experienced a constant reduction in its 
sales, nowadays equal to 878 million €. Instead, the number of 
employees has constantly increased from 2011, even if with a 
reduced slope in more recent years. Nowadays, the company 
employs more than 3000 people. This further show the failure 
of the reshoring strategy. Moreover, the company has always 
been convinced about the correctness of the offshoring choice, 
as proven by the COO’s words: “Made in Italy is fundamen-
tally accessible in a difficult way for the company because 
obviously, the cost of manufacturing is high… we can also find 
suppliers abroad that do everything we need, and I have to 
say that over the years the logistics costs have been reduced.”
4.4  It‑Yarns
It-Yarns was founded as a producer of colourants and 
chemicals for the textile industry by an Italian family in 
1905. After almost 10 years in Milan, the company moved 
its activities within the textile district of Bergamo and 
opened new departments for dyeing activities. Nowadays 
the company is the leader in terms of volume in Europe 
and differentiate from its competitors thanks to the product 
quality and the high service level. Over the years, the 
company and its major customer became very closely tied, 
almost 40% of It-Yarns’ turnover was generated by this 
customer. Driven by the need to look for lower production 
costs, the two companies together acquired a plant in 
Hungary in 2004. The acquisition allowed the companies 
to maintain some major customers looking for lower prices 
and to integrate production activities that were previously 
outsourced. It-Yarns was producing the basic colours and 
lower-end yarns at a lower production cost in the offshore 
plant. In 2011, the customer and partner of It-Yarns decided 
to further offshore to Egypt in search of even lower costs. 
At that point, It-Yarns had to decide whether to maintain 
the Hungarian plant by its own or to relocate back to 
Italy. At first, the company was looking for alternative 
partners because the plant needed new investments to 
buy newer machinery. When the company realized that 
it was not possible to find a new partner in a short time, 
the entrepreneurs, the three brothers that inherited the 
company’s ownership and management, decided together 
to relocate to the home country. The decision to completely 
move back activities reflects the failure of the offshoring 
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strategy. The products made in the Hungarian plant were 
moved back to Italy, where free capacity was available 
and where the advanced competencies allowed to quickly 
understand the slightly different production process followed 
at the Hungarian plant. This decision allowed the company to 
maintain the customers that had been served from Hungary 
but providing higher quality and a better service level. As 
explained by the entrepreneur, the company well assessed 
the decision to bring production back to its Italian plant: “It 
was decided to return production in the Italian factory after 
having carried out a performance analysis, thanks to which 
we could see that the Italian branch would have been able to 
produce the part of the production that was made in Hungary, 
without having any particular capacity problems”. After the 
reshoring decision and its implementation, the company 
has reported steady sales of around 9 million € and a slight 
reduction in the number of employees. Today, the company 
sells around 6 million € and employ around 60 employees, 
35 people less than in 2011. All in all, the reshoring strategy 
was considered a success by the company, while the lower 
economic results were attributed to the global downturn of 
the industry. Nowadays, It-Yarns is still strongly collaborating 
with its major customer, the decision to follow the customer 
in the offshoring initiative was inevitable to maintain a good 
relationship and to further strengthen it.
5  Cross‑case analysis
The cross-case comparison aims to compare both the 
offshoring and reshoring strategies of the four studied 
companies, to define commonalities and differences. To 
properly compare and contrast the cases, as aimed with the 
cross-case analysis, the three building blocks of the relocation 
processes identified by Boffelli and Johansson (2020) are 
detailed both for offshoring and reshoring for each case. In 
the end, whether and where mistakes happened is highlighted. 
Table 3 reports the details of the cross-case analysis.
By comparing the cases, we can see that mistakes 
are not only happening during the decision-making, but 
also at the implementation stage of the relocation (i.e., 
offshoring and reshoring) processes. While cases It-Shoes 
and Pt-Shoes report mistakes at the decision-making stage 
of the offshoring process, all the cases, except It-Shoes, 
report mistakes at the implementation stage either for 
offshoring or reshoring. In particular, It-Shoes decided to 
offshore on the wave of a bandwagon movement of similar 
companies to Romania and by addressing the pushing 
requests from the main customer, without considering the 
importance of investing on the owned brand to keep the 
margins high enough to make the business profitable and 
autonomous from someone else’s decisions (i.e., wrong 
decision-aking). Pt-Shoes made a similar error leveraging 
on a low-cost strategy in a period in which differentiation 
could have made the difference to strengthen its brand 
and survive a possible future crisis (i.e., wrong decision-
making). Implementation mistakes are instead related to a 
lack of the ability to manage the relocation, i.e., offshoring 
or reshoring, project. First, it is possible to recognize the 
presence of mistakes during the offshoring implementation 
of It-Yarns since it lacked in making the right investments to 
renew machinery from the beginning and had to renounce 
to the Hungarian plant once the main partner and customer 
decided to invest in Egypt. Pt-Shoes, instead, did not 
consider the lower productivity of the workers in Morocco, 
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thus expecting a different performance from the offshore 
activity. Moreover, the company lacked in considering 
the different culture and to plan proper actions to assure 
better integration. Pt-Shoes experienced mistakes in the 
implementation of reshoring too, for which the hope to 
simply undo the previous decision was not enough to make 
it successful. Also, It-Clothes implemented the reshoring 
in a wrong way, by missing the opportunity to capture 
the value of the Made in Italy brand by selecting a wrong 
price for the new product and by lacking to define a proper 
marketing campaign.
This distinction between mistakes at the decision-
making or the implementation stage allows understanding 
what the unsuccessful cases, either in the offshoring or 
reshoring, have in common. All of them share a wrong 
implementation, independently on what happened during the 
decision-making or, in case of reshoring, during the previous 
offshoring process. Figure 2 represents the commonalities 
between successful (in the upper part of the figure, namely 
the “Not happened” row) and unsuccessful (in the bottom 
of the figure, namely the “Happened” row) cases. What 
happened during the implementation makes the difference.
In the next section, these results are further discussed.
6  Discussion
The results from the cross-case analysis, allow us to 
provide answers to our exploratory research questions. 
The first research question tackled in this study was “What 
types of mistakes occur along the decision-making and 
implementation process? “ The empirical results allow 
to further develop the acquainted conceptualization that 
distinguishes between reshoring as a correction of mistakes 
or as a strategic shift in response to changes in either internal 
or external environment (Barbieri et  al. 2018). Results 
show that besides the mistakes related to decision-making, 
an additional class of mistake, related to implementation, 
need to be brought to the attention of researchers and 
practitioners. Thus, the first proposition emerging from this 
research is:
RP1: In the context of manufacturing relocations, 
mistakes need to be further distinguished between 
decision-making mistakes and implementation mistakes.
Particularly, from the cases hereby presented we can 
list some examples of both decision-making mistakes and 
implementation mistakes. Even though this list does not 
pretend to be comprehensive, it helps in reaching a better 
understanding of the two concepts.
Decision-making mistakes are usually derived from 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































decisions that often lead decision-makers to bounded rational 
decisions (Gray et al. 2017; Boffelli et al. 2018, 2020). As 
reported in the cross-case analysis, It-Shoes offshored to 
Romania by imitating its competitors and to address the 
requests from its major customer, thus failing to invest in its 
owned brand and increase its market share. Pt-Shoes made 
a similar error leveraging on a low-cost strategy instead of 
differentiating its offer with a competitive brand. Examples of 
implementation mistakes are instead provided by Pt-Shoes, 
which did not consider the lower productivity of the workers 
in Morocco, the international money transfer, and the 
challenges connected to the integration in a different culture; 
or by It-Clothes, which failed to plan a proper marketing 
campaign, was not able to control the ongoing project and 
recognized its own mistakes with the product pricing.
The nature of mistakes seemed also to influence the 
“content” (products and activities) of the reshoring initiative; 
in fact, differences emerge among the four companies. 
Particularly, while relocating at the home country, both 
Pt-Shoes and It-Yarns decided to close the offshore plant 
interrupting every manufacturing activities. On the contrary, 
It-Shoes and It-Clothes decided to maintain abroad some 
manufacturing activities. It-Shoes continued to produce 
uppers in Romania, even if with a new supplier, since their 
high impact on total production costs and the low one on the 
product perceived value. It-Clothes, instead, brought back 
to Italy only a specific product in a small volume. Therefore 
these companies showed selectivity either in terms of width 
(meaning that specific product lines were relocated) or in 
terms of depth (meaning that specific production activities 
were relocated), according to Di Stefano et al. (2018). What 
differentiates the two clusters of companies is the type of 
committed mistakes. The two companies that decided to 
completely relocate to the home country (IT-Yarns and 
Pt-Shoes) and not to apply a selective reshoring (Baraldi 
et al. 2018; Di Stefano et al. 2018), made mistakes in the 
offshoring implementation. The above discussion leads to 
the following propositions:
RP2a: Reshoring deriving from mistakes connected to 
offshoring implementation involves all production lines 
and production phases earlier offshored.
RP2b: Reshoring may be selective, both in terms of width 
and depth, in case mistakes were not occurring during 
offshoring or were connected only to offshoring decision-
making.
Concerning motivations that pushed the investigated 
companies to relocate production activities, they do not seem 
to be connected to the nature of mistake or the success of 
the relocation decision. In this respect, the first relocation 
decision (offshoring) has been boosted in the two shoes-
making companies by the search of lower costs (especially 
labour ones). This is consistent with earlier studies on the 
industry (Camuffo et al. 2006; Verdu et al. 2012; Martínez-
Mora and Merino 2014; Di Mauro et al. 2018). The second 
main common motivation for the relocation decision was 
the customers’ pressure for lower prices since both were 
contractors mainly. Finally, a third relevant driver explains the 
offshoring decision of both companies: the so-called “mimetic 
behaviour” (Silva et al. 2018), that is the imitation of strategies 
already implemented by other companies operating in the 
same industry and especially in the same industrial district 
(also known as “bandwagon effect”). Instead, for It-Clothes the 
main reason behind the offshoring decision was a change in the 
company’s strategy that was shifting from being a manufacturer 
to becoming a retailer. Of course, production costs (including 
labour) made the difference in the choice of the locations. 
Finally, It-Yarns was seizing an investment opportunity with 
its major customer, even if the pressure of the customer played 
a role in influencing the decision. To summarize, while the first 
two companies (It-Shoes and Pt-Shoes) were looking for cost 
advantages, the latter two (It-Yarn and It-Clothes) were driven 
by more strategic purposes. Even if they were not sharing 
similar offshoring drivers, Pt-Shoes and It-Yarn were the two 
companies that made implementation mistakes that brought to 
unsuccessful offshoring. Concerning the motivations behind 
reshoring, Pt-Shoes and It-Yarns closed the offshore plants and 
moved production back to the home country as a reaction to 
the mistakes committed during the offshoring phase, namely 
concerning both decision-making and implementation in the 
case of Pt-Shoes, only implementation in the case of It-Yarns. 
On the contrary, It-Shoes and It-Clothes decided to repatriate 
only specific parts of the production activities, as in the 
It-Shoes case, or a specific product, as in the It-Clothes case. In 
both cases, reshoring was part of a bigger strategy to leverage 
on the “Made in Italy”, thus gaining higher margins. Besides, 
it must be noted that, for It-Shoes, the reshoring decision was 
taken when the entrepreneur understood that the pressures for 
a lower price by the main customer were impossible to meet 
without a further offshoring strategy, an option the entrepreneur 
considered impossible to pursue. In the case of reshoring, 
Pt-Shoes and It-Yarns reacted to managerial mistakes, while 
It-Shoes and It-Clothes relocated because of strategic changes. 
Also, in this case, a common pattern cannot be identified, since 
Pt-Shoes and It-Clothes made implementation mistakes, thus 
resulting in an unsuccessful reshoring. The above discussion 
leads to the following proposition:
RP3: The drivers of relocation decisions do not influence 
the type of mistakes committed and the success of the 
relocation.
The second question this study aimed to address was 
“How mistakes affect the outcome, in terms of success or 
failure, of a relocation strategy?”. The results from the 
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multiple-case study show that it is the implementation that 
makes the difference in relocations. Even cases in which the 
decision was right, resulted in unsuccessful relocation if the 
implementation was not properly managed (e.g. It-Yarns’ 
offshoring, Pt-Shoes’ and It-Clothes’ reshoring). Vice versa, 
wrong decisions might be turned into successful relocations 
if implemented well (e.g. It-Shoes’ offshoring).
Thus, a research proposition can be advanced from the 
insights hereby presented:
RP4: To make a relocation decision successful, it is more 
important to correctly implement the decision rather than 
make the right decision.
This proposition and the connected results further 
highlight the relevance of the implementation and all the 
connected activities in manufacturing relocations, even 
though they have been mainly addressed conceptually until 
now (Bals et al. 2016; Barbieri et al. 2018).
Finally, one result that needs to be highlighted is the lack 
of path dependency between offshoring and reshoring when 
it comes to both the type of mistakes and the success of 
the relocation initiative. This result is somehow contrasting 
with previous literature that claimed the presence of path 
dependency between offshoring and reshoring (Kinkel 
2012) and reported results aligned with such hypothesis with 
respect, for example, to the entry mode (Wan et al. 2019) 
and drivers (Barbieri et al. 2019). Kinkel (2012) provided 
results supporting the claim that the experience with 
previous relocations matters, thus suggesting that companies 
rely on “already practiced and well-rehearsed behavioural 
patterns and strategies, using existing interpersonal links 
and organizational routines” (Kinkel 2012, p. 712). This 
evidence seems not to be supported by our results since they 
show that companies experiencing an offshoring decision-
making affected by mistakes; while reshoring, either make 
mistakes in implementation or do not make mistakes at all. 
Also, failure in offshoring does not necessarily mean failing 
the reshoring strategy too. To conclude, the last research 
proposition emerging from our study is the following:
RP5: Reshoring does not show path dependency features 
when it comes to the type of mistakes and the success of 
the relocation initiative.
7  Conclusions
This study aimed to understand what types of mistakes can 
occur along with the decision-making and implementation 
processes and whether how mistakes occurred in the 
company’s history of relocation decisions – i.e., both 
during offshoring and reshoring – affect the outcome, 
in terms of failure or success, of the relocation strategy. 
Given the explorative nature of the research, a multiple-
case study approach was adopted by focusing on four 
companies operating in the fashion industry. More 
specifically, both successful and unsuccessful cases have 
been compared. We analysed four cases that covered all the 
possible combinations of either successful or unsuccessful 
offshoring and either successful or unsuccessful relocations: 
namely both successful, both unsuccessful, successful 
offshoring but unsuccessful reshoring, and unsuccessful 
offshoring but successful reshoring. The comparison of 
these cases and the analysis of similarities and differences 
among them allowed us to find patterns to be linked to the 
results of the relocations. In the end, six propositions that 
explain our results ideally to be tested in future research 
have been developed. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first attempt to look at cases of failures in the context 
of reshoring and we believe this created new insights that 
could not emerge from the analysis of only successful 
cases. We have been able to further distinguish mistakes 
related to the decision-making from those related to the 
implementation. The latter emerged as having a relevant 
impact on the success of the relocation, both in case 
of offshoring and reshoring. This result generates an 
important contribution to the literature on reshoring and 
manufacturing relocations in general, since it brings the 
attention to the importance of this distinction, further 
supported by the relevance of implementation mistakes 
in explaining the failure of relocation initiatives. The 
latter evidence supports the strong entanglement among 
the phases of a relocation process, particularly when it 
comes to implementation and outcomes. Furthermore, this 
paper contributes to the debate on reshoring, in so doing, 
it confirms the usefulness of the suggestion to investigate 
the dichotomous conceptualization of reshoring (Bals et al. 
2016), either as a correction to a previous mistake (Kinkel 
and Maloca 2009; Ellram et  al. 2013; Kinkel 2014) or 
as a reaction to changes in the firm’s external or internal 
environment (Martínez-Mora and Merino 2014; Fratocchi 
et al. 2016).
The findings hereby presented generate implications 
for both managers, and decision-makers in general, and 
policymakers. From our study managers derive the 
indication that doing the things right is more important than 
doing the right thing. The failure of relocation initiatives 
emerged to be directly connected to mistakes made in 
the implementation phase. Reshoring literature already 
recognized that reshoring decisions might be subjected 
to complexity (Boffelli et al. 2020) and uncertainty (Gray 
et al. 2017), however, even if decisions might be made 
in such a context, focusing on making plans and check 
the correctness of the implemented actions might turn 




tools were developed in the past to support reshoring 
implementation, such as the Reshoring Guidebook 
provided by the US-based consultancy company Reshoring 
Institute (Blue Silk Consulting 2014). Although, these tools 
are usually developed to fit a specific geographical context, 
characterized by specific incentives and governmental 
support. Instead, we suggest managers to rely on transversal 
project management tools and capabilities that would 
allow to manage even a relocation project effectively and 
efficiently. Besides this, defining a project manager, with 
recognized responsibility, and providing him/her a team 
with both technical and project management capabilities 
would drastically increase the success of any relocation 
strategy.
These findings are in line with several organizational 
theories that challenge the concept of strategy and 
rational decision making (Cohen et al. 1972; Mintzberg 
1978; Weick 1995). Often strategy is more the ex-post 
interpretation of subsequent decisions rather than a clear 
ex-ante statement of what organizations aim to achieve. 
In this perspective, any decision will not lead to good 
results without proper implementation; on the contrary, if 
the wrong decision is well implemented, it will still allow 
organizations to obtain positive results, often influencing to 
a great extent the future of the companies’ strategy.
Concerning policymakers, this paper informs them about 
the importance not only to push companies in deciding 
to bring manufacturing back but also in supporting them 
during the implementation of such a decision, so to have 
a successful reshoring. In this respect, we believe, and our 
cases confirmed it, that the highest relevance lies on building 
adequate conditions to bring manufacturing activities back, 
such as the availability of skilled human resources, as 
already noted in other contributions related to the fashion 
industry (see, among others Anson 2016; Bettiol et al. 2017; 
Boffelli et al. 2020).
Besides the insights and the implications generated by 
this research, several limitations must be acknowledged. 
First, it is focused on a specific context, namely the 
fashion industry and Europe. The considered companies 
belong to European Union countries, which share some 
commonalities in terms of production systems, especially 
for the investigated industry. Therefore, our conclusions 
may not be generalized to different contexts. The study 
relies on four cases, two success and two failure cases 
allowing us to generate a theoretical contribution. 
Nevertheless, we believe that expanding the analysis 
with additional case studies, especially in the case of 
unsuccess, would generate further insights going in a 
theory refinement and expansion direction (Silva and 
Silva 2012). This prompt for future large-scale research, 
allowing to test the validity of the hereby advanced 
propositions.
Appendix A – The semi‑structured interview 
protocol
• Section 1: General information about the company and 
the interviewees
Interviewees: Names, roles, experience.
Company: Number of employees, turnover, main 
products, number, and location of plants.
• Section 2: Evolution of the manufacturing footprint
Main steps over years in terms of relocations and 
changes in governance modes
Focus on one (or more) reshoring decision(s):
• Chain of events connected to the reshoring 
decision(s)
• Products/Activities/Supply Chain involved and 
their characteristics
• Objectives, Drivers of the decision(s), Enabling 
factors, Outcomes
• Section 3: Decision-making stage
Description of the decision-making and timing
Phases, stakeholder involved, collected information, 
risks evaluated
Differences with previous offshoring
• Section 4: Implementation stage
Description of the implementation and timing
Phases, stakeholder involved
Changes in the relationships with stakeholders after 
reshoring
Learning process, criticalities faced, costs and benefits
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